International Arbitration in Latin America: A Region at the Crossroads of Reform, Resistance, and Record Caseloads (2024–2026)

I. Introduction

Latin America has long held a central position in the architecture and evolution of international investment arbitration. From Argentina’s early and contentious engagement with the ICSID system during its 2001–2002 economic crisis, to Bolivia’s pioneering denunciation of the ICSID Convention in 2007, to recent significant awards, the region has served as both a laboratory and a battleground for the development of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) norms.

The period from 2024 to 2026 has intensified these dynamics. ICSID registered 109 new proceedings in fiscal year 2025—the highest number in the Centre’s history—with Latin American and Caribbean states collectively accounting for more than one-third of all newly-registered cases.

As of December 31, 2023, there were 1,344 publicly-known ISDS cases globally, of which South and Central American and Caribbean states were respondents in 380 cases, representing 28.5% of all publicly-reported claims. 

The decade spanning 2013 to 2023 witnessed 202 lawsuits filed against Latin American and Caribbean countries, a 120% increase over the preceding decade.  The overwhelming majority of these claims (77.4%) were brought before ICSID. 

This article surveys these developments with a focus on particularly consequential jurisdictions: Colombia, which faces record exposure and has announced its intention to withdraw from ICSID; Peru, which has become the most-sued state before the Centre; Argentina, which has inaugurated a new investment regime while still contending with legacy crisis-era claims; and Mexico, whose treaty renegotiations under the USMCA raise novel questions about the future scope of investment protections in the hemisphere. The article also addresses developments in Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Honduras, and the broader commercial arbitration landscape in Brazil and Chile.

The analysis proceeds in three parts: Part II examines country-specific developments; Part III identifies regional trends likely to generate future claims; and Part IV offers recommendations for investors, states, and practitioners.

II. Country-Specific Developments

A. Colombia: Record Exposure and Political Confrontation

1. A Country Facing Multiple Disputes

Colombia stands at the epicenter of the current ISDS practice in Latin America. Over the past decade, the country has faced 23 known ISDS claims, with pending proceedings exposing the state to potential liability exceeding USD 13 billion. This is equivalent to more than 13% of the government’s annual budget.  Additionally, Colombia faces an estimated 286 potential ISDS claims relating to fossil fuel projects, a figure that underscores the state’s acute vulnerability at the intersection of energy transition policy and investment protection obligations.

Recent awards have yielded mixed results for the state. In Red Eagle v. Colombia, where a Canadian gold-mining company sued over environmental protection policies that effectively eliminated promised protection for grandfathered operations, the tribunal ruled that Colombia’s decisions to protect páramo ecosystems (wetlands typically found in the Andes Mountains) did not constitute a violation of the minimum standard of treatment vis-à-vis an investor with no vested right.  Similarly, in Seda and Others v. Colombia, which involved the expropriation of a luxury real estate development based on allegations of corruption, the tribunal accepted Colombia’s invocation of the essential security interest exception under the U.S.–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA), dismissing all claims. 

Conversely, in Telefónica v. Colombia, which arose from a Colombian Constitutional Court ruling in 2013 that legislative reforms which clarified that only the radio spectrum (not physical infrastructure assets) would revert to the state upon expiry of telecoms concessions did not apply to pre-existing contracts, the tribunal found a breach of the fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) standard and awarded the claimant approximately USD 380 million, a decision Colombia has challenged in annulment proceedings.  In Glencore v. Colombia, where the state’s Comptroller General had fined a Glencore subsidiary for a negotiated amendment to its mining contract and sought to annul the contract, the Swiss investors prevailed in the first of two related cases, obtaining an award of USD 19 million.  Meanwhile, the Eco Oro v. Colombia case, involving a USD 696 million claim arising from a 2016 Constitutional Court decision to protect páramos from mining, where the tribunal found liability but awarded no damages, is currently in annulment proceedings and remains one of the most closely watched cases in the extractive sector. 

Another notable development has been the settlement reached between Aris Mining (formerly Gran Colombia Gold) and the Republic of Colombia, marking the first agreement of its kind resolving an ISDS claim against the country and ending a dispute dating back to 2018. 

2. Political Developments: The Petro Administration and ICSID

Under President Gustavo Petro, Colombia had taken an increasingly confrontational stance toward the ISDS regime. In March 2026, President Petro announced Colombia’s intention to withdraw from the ICSID Convention, following an open letter from more than 220 economists and legal scholars supporting his action.  As of the time of writing, no formal notice of denunciation has been deposited with the World Bank, and the March 2026 statement remains a political declaration rather than a legal development. Further, with President Abelardo de la Espriella replacing Petro in August 2026, the new administration is viewed by many observers as likely to take a more pro-business policy direction and to adopt a more business-friendly approach. 

In January 2025, the United States and Colombia issued a binding Free Trade Commission decision interpreting and narrowing the scope of almost every protection within the investment chapter of the U.S.–Colombia TPA (including most-favored nation treatment, national treatment, minimum standard of treatment, and expropriation), signaling a bilateral approach to constraining ISDS protections without formal treaty renegotiation.

Regional precedent suggests that ICSID denunciation, even if formalized, would be unlikely to halt the flow of investor claims. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela all denounced the ICSID Convention between 2007 and 2012, yet none ceased to receive claims—they collectively faced 55 publicly-known proceedings after their respective withdrawals.  Moreover, denunciation of the ICSID Convention does not terminate Colombia’s bilateral investment treaties or free trade agreements, most of which provide for alternative arbitration fora, including UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration and ICSID Additional Facility proceedings.

Colombia’s government has also committed to ending new oil and gas contracts and has endorsed the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty. These policy positions, combined with the country’s extensive network of investment treaties, create substantial potential for future claims from energy sector investors.

B. Peru: The Most-Sued State at ICSID

1. A Dubious Distinction

Peru has emerged as the state with the highest number of pending cases at ICSID, facing between 20 and 24 active proceedings at any given time during 2025–2026. The state’s worst-case liability from pending claims amounts to approximately USD 30 billion, or roughly 9.28% of GDP, a figure that places enormous fiscal pressure on the government’s capacity to manage contingent liabilities. 

The largest pending claim is Brookfield Asset Management v. Peru, registered on March 12, 2025, under the Canada–Peru FTA, in which the claimant seeks approximately USD 2.7 billion over the Rutas de Lima toll-road concession.  Brookfield claims Peru illegally expropriated its Rutas de Lima toll road concession by permitting Lima's municipal government to block toll collection. The case reportedly remains at an early procedural stage.

Other significant proceedings include:

• ENAGÁS v. Peru, which resulted in a December 2024 award of USD 176.4 million over a gas pipeline dispute; 
• Freeport-McMoRan Inc., Sociedad Minera Cerro Verde S.A. (SMCV) v. Peru, where Peru is alleged to have violated a royalty and tax stabilization clause, with damages valued at USD 909 million under the U.S.–Peru TPA;  and
• the Lupaka Gold Corp. v. Peru award, in which the tribunal held the state liable for breaches of the Canada–Peru FTA caused by the actions of a local rural community that hindered a mining project, an unpaid award that has grown to approximately USD 68.6 million with compound interest. 

The sectoral distribution of pending claims reflects global trends: eight target the oil, gas, and mining sectors; six involve transport infrastructure; and two concern power and energy. Peru also faces 325 domestic commercial arbitrations at the Lima Chamber of Commerce, reflecting a broader pattern of contractual disputes with foreign and domestic investors.

2. Legislative and Institutional Developments

Peru has undertaken significant legislative reforms affecting arbitration practice, including with respect to mandatory registration of cases. Legislative Decree No. 1660 (September 2024) modified the Peruvian Arbitration Law, extending the obligation to register with RENACE (the National Registry of Arbitrations) to all arbitrations seated in Peru.  Relatedly, Supreme Decree No. 016-2025-JUS (August 21, 2025) issued the RENACE implementing regulations, making registration mandatory, although providing no express sanctions for non-compliance.  Commentators have expressed concern that the registration requirement may discourage foreign arbitrators from accepting appointments in Peru-seated arbitrations, potentially undermining Lima’s competitiveness as an arbitral seat.

Additionally, Law No. 32449 (in force September 2025) establishes Private Special Economic Zones (ZEEPs), aimed at attracting foreign investment through regulatory incentives.  This could lead to increased foreign investment, with a potential knock-on effect on arbitration claims.

Peru's courts, meanwhile, are considered to take a generally supportive stance toward international arbitration. In September 2025, the Lima Superior Court of Justice recognized a Paris-seated partial award in the Municipality of Lima v. Lima Expresa case, a dispute over the validity of the Línea Amarilla urban toll road concession and contract amendments challenged as tainted by corruption linked to the Odebrecht Lava Jato scandal, where the court held that unproven corruption allegations and the mere existence of ongoing criminal investigations were insufficient to deny recognition under the New York Convention's public policy exception. 

C. Argentina: Legacy Claims and the RIGI Regime

1. A History of ISDS Claims

Argentina’s engagement with ISDS continues to be shaped by the long shadow of the 2001–2002 economic crisis, which generated more than 60 ICSID arbitrations, the most extensive wave of investment claims brought against a single state until the more recent spate of claims against Spain arising from its revamping of its renewable energy incentives program.

Those claims are not all a thing of the past. The period 2024–2026 has seen the resolution of the largest crisis-era award, as well as the inauguration of a transformative new investment incentive regime.

On May 30, 2025, the tribunal in AES Corporation v. Argentine Republic issued an award of USD 715.9 million, plus costs and interest, for a total exceeding USD 821 million. This is the largest award in any of the 60-plus ICSID arbitrations arising from the financial crisis.  The tribunal unanimously held that Argentina’s post-crisis electricity sector measures breached the FET standard under the U.S.–Argentina BIT, and that these measures could not be justified by the customary international law defense of necessity. Argentina was ordered to bear all arbitration costs (USD 1.2 million) and reimburse 80% of AES’s legal fees (USD 15.8 million).

Of the crisis-era claims more broadly, four were decided in favor of Argentina, 19 against, while the remainder were settled or discontinued. Argentina sought the annulment of all adverse awards, succeeding only once in full (Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic) and twice partially.

In a related but distinct development, in March 2026 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned a USD 16.1 billion judgment entered by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in favour of former YPF shareholders, who had brought claims against Argentina arising from its 2012 renationalisation of the company. The reversal provided Argentina with significant relief from what would have been its largest investment-related liability.

2. The RIGI Regime

Looking forward, Argentina’s most significant policy development is the Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones (RIGI), established by Law 27.742 (July 8, 2024).  RIGI creates a specialized investment regime for large-scale projects, offering 30-year regulatory stability guarantees together with tax, customs, and foreign exchange benefits. The regime covers mining, technology, energy, oil and gas, infrastructure, forestry, and tourism.

Critically for arbitration, RIGI provides for dispute resolution under ICC Rules, PCA Rules, or the ICSID Convention, with the arbitral seat outside Argentina (unless ICSID applies).  Argentina has already announced a “Super RIGI” to further enhance incentive packages, signaling the current administration’s commitment to attracting large-scale foreign investment through strong contractual protections. This is seen as a marked departure from the approach of previous administrations.

D. Mexico: Energy Reform, Judicial Restructuring, and USMCA Uncertainty

1. Frequent Claims and Risky Policies

Mexico continues to be a frequently sued state in the ISDS system, with nine cases registered against the country in FY2024 alone. Many of these arise from the mining sector as “legacy claims” under NAFTA Chapter 11.

The Silver Bull Resources v. Mexico case, where the government was accused of violating treaty protections by failing to take action against an illegal blockade by members of a local cooperative, drew particular attention as the first ICSID case to adjudicate extortion by local groups as a potential breach of the full protection and security (FPS) standard under a bilateral investment treaty.  The claims were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, but the claimant is said to be considering its further options.

Mexico’s October 2024 energy reform, which enshrines state dominance in the electricity sector, and the September 2024 judicial reform, which restructured judicial appointment mechanisms, have collectively raised significant rule-of-law concerns among foreign investors, including concerns that a politically-appointed judiciary subject to political discipline is less likely to provide the independent, impartial adjudication that underpins contract enforcement, regulatory predictability, and protection against arbitrary state action. 

These developments are expected to accelerate the use of commercial arbitration as an alternative to domestic litigation in Mexico. Parties to commercial contracts, both domestic and international, might increasingly favour arbitration clauses specifying seats outside Mexico, seeking the procedural certainty and enforceability advantages that arbitration offers when confidence in judicial independence is diminished. Mexico’s arbitration community has already reported increased interest in ICC and other institutional arbitration for disputes that might previously have been litigated in Mexican courts.

2. Uncertainty Regarding the USMCA

Perhaps most consequentially, the 2026 USMCA review has introduced structural uncertainty regarding investment protections for the post-NAFTA era.

The USMCA significantly narrowed investor protections relative to NAFTA Chapter 11: Annex 14-C legacy claims expired on July 1, 2023; Annex 14-D provides a narrower mechanism for U.S.–Mexico disputes; and Annex 14-E preserves broader protections only for covered government contracts in specified sectors.

Under USMCA Article 34.7, the United States declined to extend the agreement, triggering an annual review process.  This could lead to a withdrawal by the U.S. at any time. There is no general post-termination survival clause for Chapter 14 protections, creating a potential protection gap for existing and future investments.

E. Other Jurisdictions

1. Ecuador

Ecuador’s relationship with ISDS remains politically fraught. In April 2024, 65% of voters in a national referendum rejected a constitutional amendment that would have formally recognized international arbitration as a valid dispute resolution method for the state, a result that, while not altering Ecuador’s international legal obligations, reveals deep public opposition to the system.  Meanwhile, Ecuador’s Constitutional Court has declared the China–Ecuador FTA constitutional precisely because it does not include ISDS mechanisms.

Recent arbitral practice has produced mixed results for the state with respect to jurisdictional objections. In Lynton Trading v. Ecuador (2025), an UNCITRAL tribunal denied BIT protections to a claimant lacking substantive business activity;  and in Worley v. Ecuador (2023), the tribunal upheld corruption allegations to decline jurisdiction.  However, in Junefield Gold v. Ecuador, the tribunal asserted jurisdiction over expropriation claims under the China–Ecuador BIT in a split decision. 

2. Bolivia and Venezuela

Bolivia, which withdrew from ICSID in 2007 as the first country ever to do so, continues to face claims under alternative fora. The long-awaited Glencore v. Bolivia award was issued in 2024, underscoring that ICSID denunciation does not eliminate treaty-based exposure. 

Venezuela, which withdrew from ICSID in 2012, has faced 24 known claims since its departure. The Diamante Trading v. Venezuela (May 2022) decision is notable for the tribunal’s acceptance of jurisdiction over dual nationals under the Spain–Venezuela BIT.  The dramatic escalation of geopolitical risk following U.S. military and economic actions in Venezuela during 2025–2026 is likely to generate a new wave of commercial and investment treaty arbitrations.

3. Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala

Honduras presents a remarkable case study in institutional volatility: having withdrawn from the ICSID Convention in February 2024, the country reversed its denunciation following a change in government and rejoined in March 2026, while being on the receiving end of five additional cases in 2024. 

For Nicaragua, the Riverside Coffee v. Nicaragua tribunal dismissed a DR-CAFTA claim arising from the occupation of a plantation during the 2018 civil unrest, holding that Nicaragua could invoke the agreement’s security exceptions. 

For Guatemala, the Kappes v. Guatemala tribunal declined damages related to the suspension of mining projects due to ILO Convention 169 consultation requirements,  while APM Terminals v. Guatemala represents the first conciliation proceedings under the 2022 ICSID Rules. 

4. Brazil and Chile: Commercial Arbitration Leaders

ISDS is not the only arbitration story significant to the region: commercial arbitration cases also continue to proliferate, particularly in Brazil and Chile.

Brazil has consolidated its position as a mature arbitration venue notwithstanding its historical non-participation in the ICSID system. The ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics for 2025 confirm Brazil’s prominence in international commercial arbitration: Brazilian parties accounted for 8.38% of the total party population, with 212 participating parties—second only to the United States, and well ahead of third-placed Spain (141 participants). 

Brazilian courts also have maintained pro-enforcement jurisprudence: the São Paulo Court of Appeals reaffirmed respect for arbitral seat jurisdiction and recognized foreign awards from the United Kingdom, while rejecting financial hardship as a basis for denial of justice.  The Centro de Arbitragem e Mediação da Câmara de Comércio Brasil-Canadá (CAM-CCBC) has issued new regulations on early production of evidence, further strengthening institutional arbitration practice.

Chile, meanwhile, has reaffirmed its arbitration-friendly approach. In August 2025, the Santiago Court of Appeals dismissed applications to set aside international arbitral awards on extra petita and ultra petita grounds, applying the principle of minimum judicial intervention. 

III. Regional Trends Likely to Drive Future Claims

A. Energy Transition and Critical Minerals

The global energy transition is fundamentally reshaping the investment dispute landscape in Latin America.

States pursuing decarbonization policies—including Colombia’s commitment to end new oil and gas contracts, Mexico’s 2022 lithium nationalization, and Ecuador’s constitutional protection of páramo ecosystems—face claims from legacy fossil fuel investors whose concessions have been disrupted or curtailed. Simultaneously, new investments in critical minerals extraction generate their own disputes when environmental regulations, social resistance, or supply chain disruptions impede project development.

Colombia’s exposure to hundreds of potential ISDS claims based on policy changes related to fossil fuel projects illustrates the structural tension between climate policy ambitions and investment protection obligations—a tension amplified by the ICJ’s July 2025 advisory opinion on climate obligations, which has significant implications for the interpretation of treaty protections in the context of climate-related regulatory measures. 

B. The Contractualization of Investment Arbitration

A significant emerging trend is the “contractualization” of investment arbitration. By this, we refer to the growing reliance on investor-state contracts, including the use of stabilization clauses and bespoke dispute resolution mechanisms (as well as alternative dispute regimes like Argentina’s RIGI), as alternatives to or supplements for treaty-based protections.  This trend reflects both states’ desire to control more closely the terms of investment protection, and investors’ preference for certainty and enforceability of their rights in relation to foreign investments.

The ICC’s 2024 statistics (which show that 44% of new cases worldwide involved the construction industry,  where contracts with states are common) underscore the commercial dimension of this trend, as infrastructure concessions increasingly embed arbitration clauses that operate independently of (or in parallel to) investment treaty protections.

C. Community Resistance and Social License

The growing role of local communities as active participants in investment disputes represents a structural challenge for both investors and states that is likely to continue.

To cite some recent examples:

• The Lupaka Gold v. Peru award held the state liable for community actions that hindered a mining project;
• Kappes v. Guatemala addressed ILO Convention 169 consultation requirements; and
• Silver Bull v. Mexico adjudicated extortion by local groups under the FPS standard.

These cases signal an increasing juridification of the social license to operate.

For investors, the practical implication is clear: community engagement and social license are no longer merely good corporate practice, but are increasingly necessary to safeguard the project and may become determinative of the legal protections available under investment treaties.

For states, the tension between such community issues as indigenous rights obligations and environmental protection mandates on one side, and investment protection commitments on the other, creates complex multi-stakeholder disputes that resist resolution through traditional bilateral frameworks and may give rise to exposure under treaty protections.

D. Dual Nationality and Corporate Nationality Planning

The issue of dual nationality remains a contested frontier in ISDS jurisprudence, as jurisdictional objections on this basis are not being consistently decided.

For example, the Diamante Trading v. Venezuela decision (May 2025), upholding jurisdiction over dual nationals under the Spain–Venezuela BIT, while the Santiago Barst & Rodríguez v. Ecuador decision (December 2025), dismissing claims by dual nationals, illustrate the divergent approaches of tribunals to this threshold question.

For corporate nationality planning purposes, these decisions underscore the importance of structuring investments through entities with clear and defensible treaty connections—particularly in jurisdictions where the scope of nationality-based protections is actively contested.

E. Geopolitical Risk and the USMCA Review

As noted above, both the 2026 USMCA review and the dramatic escalation of U.S. actions in Venezuela during 2025–2026 introduce geopolitical variables that are likely to generate new categories of disputes in the coming years.

That said, as a potential counterbalance, the expiration of NAFTA legacy claim mechanisms, combined with the narrower protections available under USMCA Annexes 14-D and 14-E, may leave significant classes of investment without treaty-based recourse. Investors in Mexico, in particular, face a diminished protection environment precisely as regulatory risk in the energy and mining sectors intensifies.

IV. Best Practices and Recommendations

A. For Foreign Investors

First, treaty and contract mapping should be conducted at the pre-investment stage. Given the narrowing of treaty protections under instruments such as the USMCA, investors should identify and be familiar with the protections available under all potentially applicable BITs and FTAs. They also should consider stabilization clauses and other contractual rights before committing capital.

Second, corporate structuring requires careful attention to nationality planning. The divergent approaches of recent tribunals to dual nationality and corporate nationality underscore the importance of establishing clear treaty connections through well-documented corporate chains.

Third, community engagement and ESG compliance have become risk management imperatives. The increasing juridification of social license issues means that failures of community engagement can translate directly into reduced treaty protections or adverse arbitral outcomes.

Fourth, contractual-style protections under regimes such as Argentina’s RIGI deserve serious consideration as complements to (or substitutes for) weakening treaty-based protections. The RIGI’s 30-year stability guarantees and its provision for ICC, PCA, or ICSID arbitration represent an architecture that may prove more durable than treaty protections subject to political renegotiation.

Fifth, investors should maintain robust contemporaneous documentation of regulatory interactions, community consultations, and government commitments, given the evidentiary burdens that modern tribunals apply to FET, FPS, and expropriation claims.

B. For Host States

First, states contemplating withdrawal from ICSID or renegotiation of investment treaties should conduct rigorous cost-benefit analyses informed by the regional precedents. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela collectively faced 55 claims after their respective ICSID denunciations, suggesting that withdrawal alone does not reduce exposure.

Second, regulatory coherence is essential. The most successful state defenses in recent awards—Red Eagle v. Colombia, Seda v. Colombia, Riverside Coffee v. Nicaragua—have benefited from well-documented regulatory processes and clear articulation of public interest justifications.

Third, states should consider proactive dispute management strategies, including early settlement negotiations (as exemplified by Colombia’s Aris Mining settlement), binding interpretive decisions through Free Trade Commissions (as in the January 2025 U.S.–Colombia decision), and the use of conciliation mechanisms such as those available under the 2022 ICSID Rules.

Fourth, states must invest in institutional capacity for managing their arbitration portfolios. Peru’s worst-case exposure of USD 30 billion and Colombia’s USD 13 billion in pending claims represent existential fiscal risks that require dedicated legal teams, inter-ministerial coordination, and strategic case management, alongside close relationships with trusted advisors at external firms expert in these types of claims.

C. For Arbitration Practitioners

The evolving landscape requires practitioners to develop expertise in the intersection of investment law with environmental regulation, human rights obligations, and climate law. The ICJ’s July 2025 advisory opinion on climate obligations, the growing body of case law on community resistance and ILO Convention 169 (an international treaty that establishes the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples and the obligations of ratifying states toward them), and the increasing reliance on essential security and necessity defenses all demand a more interdisciplinary approach to case preparation and advocacy.

Practitioners should also closely monitor legislative developments such as Peru’s RENACE regime, which may affect the practical logistics of conducting arbitrations seated in the region; Argentina’s RIGI, which offers alternative protections for investments; and the contractualization trend, which requires facility with both commercial and investment arbitration frameworks.

V. Conclusion

Latin America stands at a crossroads with respect to international disputes. Record caseloads at ICSID coexist with growing political resistance to the ISDS system. New investment incentive regimes (Argentina’s RIGI) operate alongside announcements of institutional withdrawal (Colombia’s threatened ICSID denunciation). Courts in Brazil and Chile strengthen arbitration-friendly jurisprudence even as referenda in Ecuador reveal deep public opposition.

The region’s experience during 2024–2026 offers several structural insights.

• First, ICSID denunciation has not, and likely will not, eliminate treaty-based exposure.
• Second, the energy transition is giving rise to a new generation of disputes that will test the boundaries of regulatory discretion, necessity defenses, and the interaction between climate obligations and investment protections.
• Third, the contractualization of investment arbitration and bespoke legislation—exemplified by RIGI—represents a fundamental shift in how states and investors negotiate the terms of investment protection, one that may ultimately prove more consequential than the continued debates over ICSID withdrawal.

For investors, policymakers, and practitioners, the imperative is clear: navigating Latin America’s investment dispute landscape requires not only technical mastery of arbitration procedure and investment treaty interpretation, but also deep engagement with the political economy, environmental governance, and social dynamics that increasingly determine both the occurrence and the outcome of investment disputes in the region.